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Abstract
The Janssen-Cilag proposal for a risk-sharing agreement regarding borte-
zomib received a welcome signal from NICE. The Office of Fair Trading re-
port included risk-sharing agreements as an available tool for the National
Health Service. Nonetheless, recent discussions have somewhat neglected
the economic fundamentals underlying risk-sharing agreements.
We argue here that risk-sharing agreements, although attractive due to
the principle of paying by results, also entail risks. Too many patients may
be put under treatment even with a low success probability. Prices are likely
to be adjusted upward, in anticipation of future risk-sharing agreements be-
tween the pharmaceutical company and the third-party payer. An available
instrument is a verification cost per patient treated, which allows obtaining
the first-best allocation of patients to the new treatment, under the risk
sharing agreement. Overall, the welfare effects of risk-sharing agreements
are ambiguous, and care must be taken with their use.
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1 Introduction
Recently, Janssen-Cilag proposed an innovative scheme of risk-sharing with the
English National Health Service (NHS) for bortezomib, which has received due
attention from NICE - National Institute for Clinical Excellence. According to the
Final Determination Appraisal from NICE,
“the manufacturer rebates the full cost of bortezomib for people who,
after a maximum of four cycles of treatment, have less than a 50%
reduction in serum M-protein (that is, less than a partial response)”
[NICE, 2007, p.1].
The risk-sharing idea is a novel approach, as no country used it in the early 1990s
(Ballance et al., 1992) and no mention is made in the survey by Scherer (2000). The
Cooksey report strongly argues for a different approach in the way pharmaceutical
prices are determined.1 The OFT report (2007) suggests its use, though on a
limited basis and with caution.2 The changes proposed to the UK system of
pharmaceutical pricing have led to an interesting and challenging discussion – see
Claxton (2007), Towse (2007) and Thornton (2007). The risk-sharing agreement
idea was used before in the UK, for the treatment of multiple sclerosis. This
previous experience for beta interferon and glatiramer is discussed in Sudlow and
Counsell (2003) and in OFT (2007, Annexe L, pp. 109 – 100).3 The Janssen-
Cilag case has also been discussed in the popular press (Pollack, 2007; Chapman,
2007). Carpenter (2007) hints that risk sharing may also hit the private health
insurance companies in the United States. None of these discussions treat in detail
1Cooksey report (2006, p. 110): “A more productive approach, therefore, might be to look
to combine some of the incentives involved in therapeutic pricing (and basing access to new
treatments on cost-effectiveness) with reforms to expedite the Critical Path process of developing
those treatments outlined above”.
2OFT (2007, p. 91): “in a limited number of cases, a risk sharing approach could be adopted”,
and OFT (2007, p. 79): “risk sharing agreements would not be the norm.”
3The earlier 1999 agreement betwen the North Staffordshire Health Authority and Pfizer
(Parke-Davis at the time)for atorvastatin is also mentioned in OFT (2007).
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the economics of risk-sharing agreements.
I argue here that too much optimism about risk-sharing agreements is probably
misplaced. The main question to ask is whether this sort of risk sharing agreement
is beneficial for the NHS, as the NICE claims it to be a “win-win” situation. At
first sight, it seems to follow the principle of “paying for performance”. However,
the drawback may lie in the price, which may be higher than otherwise.
Moreover, relevant effects from an economic point of view may not end here. There
are two other roles that may be performed by this risk-sharing agreement. The
first is a pure signalling effect. Only firms holding a sufficiently high degree of
confidence in their product will go for the system, as it is less costly for them than
for the others. This will provide further information to the NHS and make it easier
for the new drug to be adopted. This is a well-understood argument and it will
not be addressed in depth here.
More interesting, in our view, is the alignment of incentives this system intro-
duces to the NHS and to the pharmaceutical industry to assess the outcomes of
treatments under the new drugs. Of course, since payment is conditional on out-
comes, each will prefer an assessment different from that of the other party.4 This
may lead to a better use of pharmaceutical products, and consequently to lower
health care spending overall. The NHS side, on the other hand, may use the
new pharmaceutical product in patients in which a positive outcome has a very
small probability, distorting the treatment decision towards the new technology.
Therefore, a careful assessement of all indirect effects is called for.
The attractiveness of pharmaceutical risk-sharing can be, therefore, quite distinct
from what one might expect at first sight.
4This element was present in the bortezomib case: the NHS claimed for a 50% reduction
in serum M-protein, while Janssen-Cilag wanted a 25% reduction to be considered effective
treatment.
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The non-trivial element lies in the way therapeutical decisions may change under
the risk-sharing arrangement, on the one hand, and on prices, on the other. Even
in countries where prices are regulated (set administratively), firms are likely to
use the argument that since the cost of the drugs is not paid out if no result is
obtained, a higher price is needed to compensate for this risk. Whenever firms do
not use, implicitly or explicitly, this argument, one may wonder whether or not
the regulated price was set too high.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents a simple model
which lays down the basic economics of the risk-sharing agreement. Section 3
discusses the benefits and costs from risk-sharing agreements. Section 4 presents
the social planner problem and the role of a verification cost per patient treated
in achieving the first-best allocation of patients. Next, Section 5 discusses the role
of detailing. Finally, Section 6 reports some final remarks.
2 The model
We consider a new treatmen, in our example a new pharmaceutical product, that
yields a benefit b > 0 to the patient if successful. If the treatment is not successful,
the patient is not harmed either. The treatment has effect on the patient with
probability pi.5 Treatment probabilities differ across individuals in the popula-
tion. We model population heterogeneity with regard to the probability of success
treatment as being distributed in the interval [0, 1], according to a distribution
function F (·), with density f(·). After a patient has been treated, the outcome
can be verified at a cost c.
Medical doctors choose the range of patients to be treated. We assume that
probability pi can be observed by doctors prior to treatment. The new treatment
5An alternative modeling is to consider uncertain benefits, where b is random. This is formally
equivalent to our approach.
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is provided under patent protection and the firm providing it is a monopolist. The
firm has the ability to set the price, p, of its product. Although it is true that in
many countries pharmaceutical prices are regulated, the initial price of a new drug
can often be influenced, if not completely determined, by firms. Moreover, patent
protection has implicit the notion that R&D investments need to be recovered
and price above marginal cost must exist for this purpose. Instead of modeling in
detail how prices are formed, we take the simple assumption of monopoly pricing.
As it will be apparent below, nothing essential depends on this assumption.
The timeline of decisions involves the firm deciding upon the price in the first
stage, followed by doctors deciding on who receives the treatment. As usual, the
model is solved by backward induction.
2.1 The decision of doctors
The decision of doctors consists of prescribing the new treatment to patients.
Given our assumptions, it is easy to see that a continuous range of patients will
be selected for the new treatment.
Whenever b− p ≥ 0, it is worth treating the patient with probability 1 of success.
Conversely, if b < p, using the new treatment yields a negative payoff to the
institution paying for the treatment.6 It is also clear that there is no benefit
from treating patients with zero probability of success under the new treatment.
Assuming b−p > 0, the optimal decision of treatment can be easily described by a
cutoff value pi∗ such that above it, all patients with probability pi ≥ pi∗ are subject
to the new treatment, while for pi < pi∗ patients are diverted to alternative modes
of treatment.
The utility for the doctors, under the current system of treatments being paid
6Social valuation will differ to the extent that p diverges from marginal cost of production.
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whether successful or not, is given by:
U =
∫ 1
pi∗
f(pi)(pib− p)dpi (1)
We consider doctors to be concerned with the patient’s welfare and the cost of
treatment provided. This assumption concentrates our focus on the implications
of the risk-sharing agreement per se and not on the implications of physician’s
agency. The choice of pi∗ that maximizes this value is characterized by the following
first-order condition:7
∂U
∂pi∗
= −f(pi∗)(bpi∗ − p) = 0⇔ pi∗ = p
b
(2)
Let w be the marginal cost of production. A social planner would also maximize
(1), with p replaced by w. As long as p > w, private decisions mean that fewer
patients than is socially optimal are treated under the new treatment. This is the
standard static monopoly distortion of the patent system.
2.2 The decision of firms
The decision variable for the firms is the price. The firm’s valuation of sales
is:
V =
∫ 1
p/b
(p− w)f(pi)dpi (3)
The problem faced by the firm is to maximize V with respect to p. The basic trade-
off to the firm, in this context, is between a higher margin and a decrease in the
number of patients treated. This is the traditional trade-off for a monopolist.
The first-order condition is given by
∂V
∂p
=
∫ 1
p/b
f(pi)dpi − p− w
b
f(p/b) = 0 (4)
7The second-order condition is also satisfied: ∂2U/∂pi∗2 = −f(pi∗)b− (pi∗b− p)∂f/∂pi∗.
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where the first term collects the advantage of selling at a higher price while the
second term reflects the cost of reduction in the number of patients treated. It is
easy to see that p > w, so a margin above the socially optimal price exists and
fewer patients will be treated than is socially optimal.
2.3 Risk sharing
We now introduce the proposal of risk-sharing between the pharmaceutical com-
pany and the NHS in our simple model. Risk-sharing means that a payment is
due only if the treatment succeeds. Once the payment becomes conditional on
outcomes, the issue of verifying the outcome arises, as both parties face opposite
interests.
For each patient treated, the NHS has an interest in claiming that treatment did
not work, in order to avoid payment, while the firm has an interest in claiming
success even if the patient’s condition did not improve. We assume that a cost c
must be incurred in order to verify the outcome of treatment.8 We also assume
that this cost is borne by the NHS.9
The objective function of doctors is given by
U =
∫ 1
pi∗
f(pi) [pi(b− p)− c] dpi (5)
The main differences to the previous problem (1) lie in a) the price is paid only
when treatment is successful; b) a cost c has to be paid per patient treated by the
NHS.
It is easy to see that the optimal decision to doctors is to prescribe treatment
8Sudlow and Counsell (2003) provide a detailed description of and issues associated with this
verification effort for the case of interferon beta and glatiramer for multiple scleroris.
9A more general approach would be to have that a fraction α of the cost is borne by the NHS
and (1−α) by the firm. Since this alternative does not add any particular insight, we opt to use
the simpler version.
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whenever
pi ≥ pi∗ = max {1, c
b− p} (6)
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that c is sufficiently small relative to
successful treatment gains such that pi∗ < 1. This also means that in the absence
of a verification cost, all patients would be taken to treatment by the NHS as costs
of unsuccessful treatments would fall on the pharmaceutical firm. Of course, this
would not be socially optimal, as scarce resources would be spent on patients with
a very small probability of actually benefiting from treatment. As the NHS doctors
deciding on whether or not to put the patient under the new treatment takes prices
as given, the over-treatment under uncostly verification holds for whatever price
is established (as long as it remains below benefit b).
The value of sales to the firm is given by
max
{p}
V =
∫ 1
pi∗
(pip− w)f(pi)dpi, pi∗ = c
b− p (7)
The corresponding first-order condition is given by:
∂V
∂p
=
∫ 1
pi∗
pif(pi)dpi − c
(b− p)2
(
c
b− pp− w
)
f
(
c
b− p
)
= 0 (8)
Now, the impact of increasing a price is slightly more involved. On the one hand,
the gains from raising the price are smaller, as the price is only received when
the outcome of treatment is positive. On the other hand, the margin received is
smaller in expected terms, meaning a lower cost of reducing demand by increasing
the price. In addition, the decrease in patients treated would be higher the larger
the price.
The comparison with equilibrium values without the risk-sharing agreement hinges
upon the values of the verification cost c.10
A special case occurs for c = 0, in which outcome verification can be performed
without costs. In this particular case, pi∗ = 0, and the equilibrium price is de-
10And also on how this cost is shared, α, if the more general approach is taken.
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termined as the highest price acceptable to the NHS. Since doctors will prescribe
treatment to all patients as long as b − p > 0, the optimal price to the phar-
maceutical firm will be p∗ = b.11 Therefore, patients treated and costs will in-
crease considerably under the risk-sharing agreement and with zero verification
cost.
3 The advantage of the risk-sharing agreement
Take the price of the new treatment as fixed and a zero verification cost. Does the
firm have any advantage from a risk-sharing agreement?
Let the profits without and with risk-sharing be denoted by V0 and V1, respectively,
where:
V0 =
∫ 1
p/b
(p− w)f(pi)dpi, V1 =
∫ 1
0
(pip− w)f(pi)dpi (9)
The change in profits is given by
∆V = V1 − V0 =
∫ p/b
0
(pip− w)f(pi)dpi −
∫ 1
p/b
(1− pi)pf(pi)dpi (10)
There is a gain from extending the number of patients that is treated but there is
a cost of not receiving payments that would be received otherwise. This term may
be positive or negative.
In terms of net benefits for the NHS, denote by U0 and U1 the net benefits without
and with risk-sharing, respectively, given by:
U0 =
∫ 1
p/b
(pib− p)f(pi)dpi, U1 =
∫ 1
0
(b− p)pif(pi)dpi (11)
11For this price, the doctors will actually be indifferent between prescribing the treatment, or
not. The firm can avoid this by setting p = b−ε, where ε is the smallest unit of account possible.
Since nothing essential is lost, we take p∗ = b and assume that under indifference doctors will
always prescribe the new treatment.
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The change in utility is
∆U =
∫ p/b
0
(b− p)pif(pi)dpi +
∫ 1
p/b
(1− pi)pf(pi)dpi > 0 (12)
In the above expression, the second term in the right-hand side is a net gain from
not paying the treatment if the treatment does not benefit the patient. The first
term, on the other hand, is the benefit from attempting to use the new technology
in every patient that was not previously exposed to the treatment. Since the
cost is paid only when the treatment has positive results, its impact is always
positive.
Therefore, in the short run, holding prices fixed, risk-sharing with the provider of
the new treatment is always beneficial to the NHS. In addition, if the agreement
was put forward by the company, then it is licit to assume ∆V > 0, so both sides
benefit. Nonetheless, from a social point of view, too many patients are treated,
as a negative social value for treatment exists for pi < w/b.
Social welfare is defined as
W =
∫ 1
pi∗
(pib− w)f(pi)dpi, pi∗ = p/b (13)
when there is no risk-sharing agreement, and is given, under the risk-sharing agree-
ment, by
W =
∫ 1
pi∗
(pib− w − c)f(pi)dpi, pi∗ = αc/(b− p) (14)
When c = 0, the change in welfare from a movement from no-risk-sharing to
risk-sharing is given by
∆W =
∫ p/b
0
(pib− w)f(pi)dpi (15)
which can be higher or lower than zero. To see this, take pi = 0. For this patient,
the social value of prescribing the treatment is negative: the patient has zero prob-
ability of benefiting from the treatment and yet the treatment consumes resources.
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Take now the patient with pi = p/b. For this patient, the net social benefit is given
by p − w > 0, meaning a gain is obtained from treating this patient under the
risk-sharing agreement while (s)he was left out in the situation of no risk-sharing
agreement. Since patients with both negative and positive social contributions will
also be treated, the welfare effect can be either positive or negative.
This assessment is also valid even if the price of the pharmaceutical product is
not kept constant across regimes. Over the medium and long run the pricing
policy is also endogenous to the system. In this setting, it means firms, when
introducing their new treatments into the market, will think also in terms of their
pricing policy: a firm anticipating that it may want to later propose a risk-sharing
agreement (or accept a proposal of the third-party payer) is likely to try to set a
different price. We model this situation by assuming that the firm will have the
freedom to set the price.
Even if both sides see an advantage to the risk-sharing agreement, social welfare,
defined as surplus over marginal cost of production) may actually decrease (if there
is a large number of patients with a low success probability). This can be easily
seen from welfare change ∆W , given by ∆W = W1 −W0 where
W0 =
∫ 1
p/b
(pib− w)f(pi)dpi, W1 =
∫ 1
0
(pib− w)f(pi)dpi (16)
are the welfare measures without and with risk-sharing agreement, respectively.
Adding the verification costs simply increases the range where social welfare de-
creases. Since price payments are a costless transfer between economic agents, and
the distortion results from NHS doctors’ decisions, the agreed price after introduc-
tion of the risk-sharing agreement is irrelevant to the welfare assessment.
11
4 The Social Planner’s choice
We have seen above that no-cost verification leads to too many new treatments
being given and to too high prices. Therefore, the existence of a verification cost
per patient treated introduced some containment in the prescription of the new
treatment. This can be beneficial as it will reduce the number of treatments under
negative expected social value and drive down prices. We now go into more detail
on the opportunities available to a benevolent social planner.
The unconstrained social optimum is given by
W =
∫ 1
pi∗
(pib− w − c)f(pi)dpi (17)
and the social planner chooses pi∗ = (w+ c)/b. However, the social planner seldom
has a direct choice over who is treated. In a second-best world, the threshold pi∗
for treatment under the new technology is set by physicians. It can be influenced
by the social planner through its choice of c (and p).
We can address the issue of first-best implementation in a second-best setting.
This means that physicians decide on which patients are taken to the new treat-
ment. Given that a verification cost τ is imposed, only patients with probability
of treatment success higher than pi∗ = τ/(b − p) will receive the new treatment.
The verification cost τ can be lower or higher than the true verification cost, as
we allow the social planner to subsidize or to tax verification activities.
Under the fixed-prices regime, the first-best allocation of patients to the new treat-
ment can be easily achieved by setting
τ
b− p =
w + c
b
(18)
or
τ = (w + c)
b− p
b
(19)
The value τ can be higher or lower than c.
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However, this value may not be optimal in a second-best world as either money
needs to be raised (if c > τ) or financial resources become available to other
objectives pursued by the social planner (if τ > c). We are taking the creation of
mechanisms to charge/pay the difference (τ − c) to be costless at the margin. Of
course, a fixed cost of setting the system simply increases the range of situations
where the risk-sharing agreement does not bring a higher social welfare. More
relevant is whether a social cost of funds needs to be considered. However, its
inclusion in the analysis needs to be done carefully, as the financial results of the
NHS institution should also be weighted in the social welfare function. To avoid
further cluttering the analysis, we consider the marginal costs of funds in the
verification cost to equal marginal cost of funds to any NHS institution.12
Suppose now the pharmaceutical firm decides the price at which it sells the new
product, after the social planner deciding on the level of the verification cost
τ . Let p = p(τ), p′(τ) < 0 denote the optimal solution to the problem of the
pharmaceutical firm.13 That is:
p(τ) = argmax
p˜
V =
∫ 1
τ
b−p˜
(pip˜− w)f(pi)dpi (20)
The social planner chooses τ in the following problem:
max
τ
W =
∫ 1
τ
b−p(τ)
(bpi − wτ) f(pi)dpi +
∫ 1
τ
b−p(τ)
(τ − c)f(pi)dpi (21)
The corresponding first-order condition yields:
∂W
∂τ
=
(
b− p(τ) + τp′(τ)
(b− p(τ)2
)(
τ
b− p(τ) − w − c
)
f
(
τ
b− p(τ)
)
= 0 (22)
So, either
τ
b− p(τ) = w + c (23)
12This assumption matches similar ones in recent analysis, see Brekke et al. (2007), for exam-
ple. It also has the advantage of not implying that authorities may want a verification cost as a
way of obtaining funds to apply elsewhere.
13This is more clearly formalized in the appendix.
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or
τ
b− p(τ) = −
1
p′(τ)
(24)
Under the technical conditions assumed, only the value resulting from the first
expression satisfies the second-order condition for a maximum. This condition
highlights that from a social planner point of view it is irrelevant whether the
verification cost is set before or at the same time of price re-alignments by the
pharmaceutical company.14 Intuitively, this results from the fact that the social
planner wants the new treatment to be given to patients as long as they have a
positive expected net social value (bpi − w − c > 0), taking the price paid by the
drug to be a costless transfer between agents in the economy.
5 The role of detailing
For ease of exposition, let us assume once again that prices are fixed. However,
the pharmaceutical company can undertake marketing and advertising campaigns,
detailing activities, to lead physicians to use their product as the preferred treat-
ment. Let η be the detailing effort. The valuation by the physician from providing
the new treatment is now given by:
U0 = η + pib− p (25)
in the absence of a risk-sharing agreement, and it is
U1 = pi(b− p) + η (26)
under the risk-sharing agreement. We assume that detailing effort has a cost given
by 1/2η2 to the pharmaceutical company.
In the absence of risk-sharing, treatment using the new drug is prescribed whenever
pib − p + η > 0. Thus, for pi > pi∗ = (p − η)/b, the new treatment is given to the
14Technically, this results from p′(τ) being irrelevant to the optimal choice of τ .
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patient.15
The pharmaceutical company chooses marketing effort η in order to maximize its
profits, and in the absence of a risk-sharing agreement, it amounts to
max
η
V0 =
∫ 1
p−η
b
(p− w)f(pi)dpi − 1
2
η2 (27)
The optimal choice of detailing level balances the benefits of inducing higher adop-
tion against the marginal cost of undertaking the effort. The associated first-order
condition is given by
∂V
∂η
=
1
b
(p− w)f
(
p− η
b
)
− η = 0 (28)
In clear contrast, under the risk-sharing agreement everyone is treated. Therefore,
the new drug does not require advertising or marketing effort to be widely accepted.
The optimal value of detailing in this case is zero, as there is no marginal benefit
from detailing but there is certainly a cost.
With a verification cost to the outcome of the treatment, a trade-off reappears. In
the event of a risk-sharing agreement, it is no longer optimal to treat all patients,
and with a positive verification cost of success, the number of patients treated
with the new pharmaceutical product can increase or decrease. Following it, the
level of marketing activities may decrease or increase. The intuition is relatively
straightforward. When the verification cost c is very high, only a very low number
of cases are treated, which increases the marginal value of inducing some further
treatments. Since only patients with a high probability of success are included for
treatment with the new drug, it is more likely that a payment is received by the
pharmaceutical company, a feature that naturally increases the marginal value to
detailing activities.
Thus, as long as verification costs are not too high, we should expect a decrease
in detailing activities at the hospital by the pharmaceutical company.
15We implicitly assume η < p.
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6 Final remarks
According to our analysis, there is more to be said about risk-sharing agreements
between third-party payers, like the NHS, and pharmaceutical companies than has
been recognized so far.
The Cooksey report, the OFT recommendation and the recent practice by NICE
seem, at first glance, to be compelling as they follow from the principle of pay-
ing by results. Indeed, we were able to easily show that under fixed prices for
pharmaceutical products: a) the NHS payments decrease, on average; b) profits
of the pharmaceutical company may increase or decrease; and c) all patients will
be treated with the new drug (as it has no financial costs in the event that the
treatment does not succeed).
Underlying this result we have several assumptions. Some of them are innocuous.
One is not. The implicit assumptions, which do not change the role of risk-sharing
agreements, are “no-harm done” to patients if the treatment fails and availability
of the old drug treatment (or any alternative treatment) in the event that the new
pharmaceutical drug fails to treat the patient.
The assumption that has an important role on the desirability of risk-sharing
agreements is that of fixed prices. Existing discussions assume drug prices to
have already been set and to be fixed. However, this assumption is unlikely to
hold. Either pharmaceutical firms have the freedom to set prices and will change
them after the risk-sharing agreement, or if they anticipate entering some sort of
outcome-related payment, they will fight for a different price to be set. In either
case, prices of pharmaceutical products will not be the same with, or without,
risk-sharing agreements.
Prices will be adjusted upward, to face the costs not covered by absence of payment
in case of treatment failure. Also, pharmaceutical companies will face a less elastic
16
demand (and will look for higher prices).
On the NHS side, treatments are expanded to a larger set of patients, now includ-
ing those cases which, in social valuation, are not worth treating under the new
technology, in an ex-ante assessment.
However, since the decision maker at the hospital only pays the price after suc-
cessful treatment, costs of providing treatment in the event of failure are ignored.
Accordingly, too many treatments will be provided in the sense that patients that
have a low probability of treatment success will also be included, although from a
social point of view, it would be better to use an alternative treatment.
Depending on the magnitude of this latter effect, NHS costs may actually increase
under the risk-sharing agreement.
The adjustment in prices therefore has the potential to undermine the advantages
of the risk-sharing agreement.
There are two other relevant issues to discuss. The first one is observability of
success from treatment with the new pharmaceutical product. The second issue is
the role of detailing and product promotion by the pharmaceutical company.
The risk-sharing agreement introduces the need to verify treatment outcomes.
Payers have an incentive to claim failure in order to avoid payment and firms have
an interest to declare success in order to receive payments. Whenever there is a cost
to ensure verification of treatment outcomes, assuming it is by the NHS, treatments
will not be expanded as widely as in its absence. Of course, for sufficiently high
verification costs, the risk-sharing regime will deliver lower social welfare than
the no-risk-sharing regime. It is also the case that by imposing an appropriately
defined verification cost on the NHS decision-maker, it is possible to achieve the
first-best allocation of patients to the new treatment. Therefore, a payment per
patient treated is advocated even under the risk-sharing agreement. This can
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be met by verification cost, and may be higher or lower. A careful analysis is
required on a case by case basis. The meed for outcomes verification, in the sense
of acquiring evidence about need and value after coverage if granted, cannot be
overemphasized. This issue also arises in schemes aimed at setting prices that will
be later reviewed according to evidence.
On the second issue, detailing by the pharmaceutical company, the risk-sharing
agreement reduces, in general, the incentive for detailing, as the risk-sharing agree-
ment expands the range of patients the NHS decides to treat under the new tech-
nology. In this sense, it substitutes for detailing activities by pharmaceutical
companies. However, if the verification cost is high and the number of patients
treated actually decreases with the introduction of the risk-sharing agreement, then
in such cases detailing effort may increase, to counteract a reduction of patients
treated.
Overall, our results argue that the call for a wider use of risk-sharing agreements
between the NHS and the pharmaceutical industry, which has been recently met
by the NICE decision regarding bortezomib, needs to be assessed with care. Only
under a restrictive set of assumptions is it welfare improving, with a crucial as-
sumption being fixed prices. Fixed prices means here that pharmaceutical firms
want to carry the same price on their product whether the risk-sharing agreement
exists, or not. Nonetheless, using as a policy instrument a verification cost paid
by the NHS institution, independent of realized outcomes, allows the first-best
allocation of patients to the new treatment to be reached.
The main message can be conveyed in a simple statement: The policy of risk-
sharing agreements is to be used with care, otherwise it can easily produce unex-
pected results, especially if price adjustments exist.
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Appendix
The second-best solution
Suppose that the pharmaceutical firm decides the price at which it sells the new
product. In a previous stage, the social planner was able to set the level of the
verification cost. The problem of the pharmaceutical firm is given by:
max
p
V =
∫ 1
τ
b−p
(pip− w)f(pi)dpi (29)
The solution to this decision problem is provided by the solution to the first-order
condition:
∂V
∂p
= − τ
(b− p)2
(
p
τ
b− p − w
)
f
(
τ
(b− p)2
)
+
∫ 1
τ
b−p
pif(pi)dpi = 0 (30)
From this expression,
∂2V
∂p∂τ
= − 1
(b− p)2
[
2pτ
b− p − w
]
f
(
τ
b− p
)
− 1
(b− p)2
(
p
τ
b− p − w
)
×
×f ′
(
τ
b− p
)
1
b− p −
(
1
b− p
)2
f
(
τ
b− p
)
(31)
If f ′(·) is not sufficiently negative and pτ/(b − p) − w > 0, the sign of ∂2V/∂p∂τ
is negative. The second condition implies that the marginal patient has positive
value for the pharmaceutical company. The negative sign of the overall expression
implies that an increase in the verification cost reduces the price charged by the
pharmaceutical company. The intuition runs as follows: by increasing the veri-
fication cost, the social planner leads the physician to increase the threshold of
patients submitted to the new treatment. If the marginal patient is profitable to
the pharmaceutical company, its optimal reaction is to decrease the price to induce
a smaller increase in the marginal probability of treatment success that leads physi-
cians to decide to use the new treatment. Now, from the first-order condition, it is
easy to see that in equilibrium, it must be the case that pτ/(b− p)−w > 0.
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